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THE 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) TRANSFER OF
TIME-BARRED CLAIMS
A plaintiff may often choose among several forums in deciding
where to file a claim.1 On the basis of current choice-of-law rules,
federal courts in each of these forums will often apply different statutes of limitations to the same claim. 2 As a result, federal courts are
sometimes confronted with limitations-barred claims that, at the time
of filing, could have been timely filed in another district court. Some
courts, rather than dismiss these claims, have invoked 28 U.S.C.
§ 14063 to transfer these claims to district courts in which the claims
might have been brought. 4 As applied by these courts, this federal
transfer statute allows time-barred claims to be transferred to forums
in which the original filing satisfies the applicable statute of
limitations. 5
Cases transferred to avoid a statute of limitations defense are of
two types: those whose only defect in the transferor court is the limitations bar6 and those marked by both a time-bar and a defect in venue,
1 This choice is generally limited by personaljurisdiction and venue constraints. Personal jurisdiction, which is subject to constitutional due process limitations, concerns the
authority of the sovereign to exercise control over the defendant Venue is based on the
convenience of the forum, and is generally governed by statute. See generally CHARLES ALAN
Wimurr, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 42 (4th ed. 1983); Kevin M. Clermont, Restating
TerritorialJurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 411, 430-43
(1983) (describing the evolving relationship between personal jurisdiction and venue).
2 Federal courts sitting in diversity will generally apply the choice of law rules of the
state in which they sit Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). State
choice of law rules may provide for application of the forum state's statute of limitations to
an action arising under the substantive law of another state. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (holding that the Constitution does not bar application of the
forum state's statute of limitations to claims governed by the substantive law of a different
state). As a result, federal courts sitting in different states may apply different statutes of
limitations to the same cause of action.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1988). The principal federal transfer provisions, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a), are discussed infra, notes 8-27 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 6 and 7 (cases transferred to cure statute of limitations defenses).
5 Transfer of venue preserves the time of filing in the original forum as the time of
commencement of the suit, thereby tolling any applicable statute of limitations. See Corke
v. Sameiet M.S. Song of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that transfer allows
plaintiff to benefit from tolling of statute of limitations).
6 See, e.g., Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988) (allowing transfer of venue
under 28 U.S.C. § 1406 to defeat statute of limitations defense); Young v. Cuddington, 470
F. Supp. 935 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (same). But see, e.g., Spar, Inc. v. Information Resources, Inc.,
956 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that transfer to save time-barred claim was not in the
"interest of justice"); Murphy v. Klein Tools, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 982 (D. Kan. 1988) (rejecting the use of § 1406(a) to save a limitations-barred claim).
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personal jurisdiction or both. 7 This Note argues that in either case
the transfer of time-barred claims is beyond the scope of the federal
transfer provisions. This Note suggests that decisions authorizing
such transfer are inconsistent with the place-of-suit and choice-of-law
matrix that governs the allocation of cases within the federal court
system. District courts should not transfer claims that do not meet the
statute of limitations of the forum in which they sit, whether or not
that forum meets the venue or personal jurisdiction requirements
necessary to try the claim.
INTRODUCTION

The successful transfer of a time-barred claim must do more than
preserve the original time of filing. The success of the transfer will
depend upon the law applied after the case is transferred. If the transferee court applies transferor law, the limitations period applicable to
the claim will not change and the transferee court will dismiss the
action. If, however, the transferee court applies its own law, the claim
may be saved by the longer transferee statute of limitations.
Courts seeking to transfer a time-barred claim to a venue in
which it may proceed thus face two related obstacles. First, the court
must have the authority to transfer a claim filed late in the transferor
court. Second, the transfer must proceed in a way that allows the posttransfer application of the transferee statute of limitations.
Part I of this Note introduces the reader to the two principal
transfer provisions that might be used to order the transfer of a limitations-barred claim: 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). Part I concludes that, given the post-transfer choice-of-law rules that have
evolved around each section, only section 1406 may be used to transfer a time-barred claim.
Part II analyzes the application of section 1406(a) to limitationsbarred claims. Section A examines the use of section 1406 where the
only defect in the transferor court is a statute of limitations defense.
Section B shows that the transfer of time-barred claims from forums
that are otherwise proper as to venue and personal jurisdiction is in7 Reported cases of this type seem to be extraordinarily rare. SeeJohn D. Currivan,
Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue, 63 CoRNELL L. REV. 149, 162
(1977) (citing Ferguson v. Kwik-Chek, 308 F. Supp. 78 (D.V.I. 1970) as "the only reported

case of this type").
There are at least two conflicting explanations for the apparent scarcity of reported
cases of this type. First, courts may decide on the transfer without considering the statute
of limitations issue. See Lau v. Change, 415 F. Supp. 627, 629 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Since
the Court believes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant, the statute of limitations issue need not be reached."). Alternatively, courts may deny transfer of claims filed
late in an improper forum that lacks either venue, personaljurisidction, or both. In either
case, the court implicidtly decides on the availablity of transfer: allowing transfer in the
former and denying it in the latter.
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consistent with the current federal choice-of-law regime. Sections A
and B conclude that section 1406 should not be used to cure defects
in limitations law. Section C suggests that section 1406 is best understood to contain a federal timely filing requirement that prohibits the
transfer of claims filed beyond the statute of limitations of the transferor forum.
I
BACKGROUND: THE FEDERAL TRANSFER STATUTES

Courts have struggled with the application of the federal transfer
of venue statutes since their enactment in 1948.8 Simply worded and
widely invoked, 9 these provisions have proved difficult to interpret less
for what they say than for what they omit.' 0 The resulting case law
has, in the words of one judge, produced a "nearly hopeless muddle
of conflicting reasoning and precedent.""
Interpretative difficulties with the federal transfer provisions have
generally been of two types: pre-transfer and post-transfer.' 2 Pretransfer issues focus on the conditions necessary for transfer pursuant
to a particular statutory section.' 3 Post-transfer issues involve the
choice-of-law rules that should be applied once transfer occurs. 14 Because the application of federal transfer law to limitations-barred
claims lies at the intersection of this framework, it is necessary to examine both pre- and post-transfer issues in detail.

8 Judicial Code of 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 937 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404,
1406 (1988)). See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
9 More than 2000 claims were transferred under § 1404(a) alone in 1982. Richard L.
Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the FederalJudicialSystem, 93 YA L.J.
677, 680 n.16 (1984).
10
Section 1406(a) makes no mention of the law to be applied once transfer has occurred. Moreover, the statute does not detail the precise jurisdictional requirements of
either the transferee or transferor courts. Professor Wright has identified § 1404(a) as the
source of a "veritable flood of litigation." WRi;HT, supra note 1, at 260.
11 Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d 1099, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981).
12 See Maryellen Coma, Confusion and Dissension Surroundingthe Venue Transfer Statutes,
53 OHIo ST. L.J. 319, 322 (1992) (distinguishing pre- and post-transfer issues in federal
transfer of venue).
A third interpretative difficulty with the federal transfer provisions concerns the requirement that the transferee court be one in which the claim "might have been brought."
This question, addressed by the Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960),
is beyond the scope of this Note.
13
Coma, supra note 12, at 322.
14 Id. at 326.
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The Pre-Transfer Realms of Sections 1404 and 1406

Congress wrote the federal transfer provisions against the backdrop of the ancient doctrine of forum non conveniens, 15 which allowed courts to decline to exercise jurisdiction over claims filed in an
inconvenient forum. 16 The resulting dismissal, if it occurred after the
running of the statute of limitations in the more convenient forum,
could result in the loss of the claim.17 Designed to improve upon the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, section 1404 allowed courts to
transfer, rather than to dismiss, claims filed in proper but inconvenient forums.1 8 Section 1404(a) provides:
For the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.19
Section 1406(a), referred to as a "legislative sibling"20 of section
1404(a), states:
The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in
the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest

15 The leading case on the doctrine of forum non conveniens is Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) (stating factors relevant to rulings on forum non conveniens
motions).
16 Although GulfOilwas decided before the promulgation of the newJudicial Code in
1948, Professor Stein suggests that the language of § 1404 actually predated Gulf Oi4 and
that the revisor's note suggesting that § 1404 was meant to codify Gulf Oilwas "a creative bit
of retroactive legislative history." Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of
Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 807 (1985).
17 Forum non conveniens dismissal was often made contingent upon the defendant's
waiver of any statute of limitations defense that would preclude pursuit of the claim in a
more convenient forum. See 15 CHARLEs A. WRiGrr ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3828, at 288 n.34 (1986 & Supp. 1994) (listing cases in which dismissal was made
contingent upon consent to jurisdiction and waiver of statute of limitations defense in
alternative forum); see, e.g., Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981) (noting
that defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal had consented to the jurisdiction

of an alternative forum).

18

The relationship between forum non conveniens and the new transfer statutes is

described in JAMEs

WM.

MOORE, MooRE's COMMENTARY ON

THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 1

0.03(28), at 199-202 (1949). See also Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 31-32 (1955)
(describing the relationship between transfer statutes and forum non conveniens doctrine); WRIGHT Ex AI-, supra note 17, at 278 (discussing the "limited continuing vitality [of
forum non conveniens) in federal courts"); WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 259-60 (noting that
forum non conveniens has "largely been superseded" by § 1404(a)). Forum non conveniens nonetheless retains some vitality with respect to actions more properly heard in
state courts or foreign countries. See id.; see, e.g., PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 239 (granting
forum non conveniens dismissal where alternative forum is in foreign country).
19 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
20 Goldlawr Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579, 583 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 396 U.S. 463
(1962).
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of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it
21
could have been brought.

Section 1406 was apparently designed to protect plaintiffs from the
dismissal of claims filed in the wrong venue by allowing claims to be

transferred to a forum where venue is proper.22 This provision served
to save claims which would otherwise be lost to the intervening run-

ning of the applicable statute of limitations in the proper court.23

Generally, courts have assigned sections 1404 and 1406 exclusive
areas of operation. 2 4 Section 1404(a) has been interpreted as a device

to move properly filed claims among courts having personal jurisdiction over the action. Section 1406(a) has been interpreted as a means
of saving claims marked by defects in venue or personal jurisdiction 25
that do not warrant dismissal. 26 The perceived differences in each

statute's area of applicability have proven instrumental in shaping the
debate over the choice-of-law rules that should follow transfer.2 7
B.

Post-Transfer Choice-of-Law

The successful transfer of a limitations-barred claim depends
upon the application of transferee statute of limitations to the trans-

ferred claim. 28 The plaintiff must seek a transfer that guarantees the
21
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988). As originally promulgated in 1948, § 1406(a) required
transfer of improperly venued cases. It was amended a year later to allow courts discretion
in dismissing claims when transfer was not in the interest ofjustice.
22
The legislative history of § 1406 does not reveal a stated purpose for the section.
See infra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
In Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962), the Supreme Court characterized
the statute as a measure aimed at "avoiding the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with
regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often
turn." Id. at 466.
23
See 15 WRIGHT Er AL., supra note 17, § 3827. Wright concluded that "[t]he reasons
for [transfer] are especially compelling if the statute of limitations has run, so that dismissal

would prevent a new suit by plaintiff." Id. § 3827, at 269.
24 See, e.g., Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140, 1147 (5th Cir.
1984), ("[s]ections 1404(a) and 1406(a) are both short, apparently clear, and seemingly
mutually exclusive"); Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 471 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting exclusive
spheres of operation for §§ 1404 and 1406); 15 WRIGHT ET .AL.,supra note 17, § 3827, at
264 (citing Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1984)).
25 The extension of § 1406 to defects in personal jurisdiction, once subject to some
debate, was settled in Goldlawr. 369 U.S. 463. See infra notes 51-65 and accompanying text
(discussing Goldlawr in greater detail).
26 See Martin, 623 F.2d at 471. See alsoWRIGHT, supranote 1, at 257 ("[s]ection 1404(a)
... permitted transfer to a more convenient forum, while § 1406(a) provided transfer, as
an alternative to dismissal, where the case is brought at an improper venue.").
27 See Currivan, supra note 7, at 151 (analyzing transfer according to the propriety of
the forum); Ferens v.John Deere, 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (same).
28 See supranote I and accompanying text. The use of forum state choice-of-law rules
will often result in the application of forum statute of limitations. Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Practical considerations, recognized by the Supreme Court in
Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), require that this rule be modified in the con-
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use of transferee law once transfer is had. Although sections 1404(a)
and 1406(a) do not specify the law to be applied after transfer, the
Supreme Court has developed a set of wooden rules governing choiceof-law after transfer of venue. These rules call for application of transferor law after all section 1404(a) transfers 29 and thus make section
1404(a) ineffective in circumventing a statute of limitations bar.
The basic analysis of post-transfer choice-of-law was developed in
Van Dusen v. Barrack,3 0 a 1964 Supreme Court decision. The Court, in
authorizing a transfer to a forum that might have applied law less
favorable to the plaintiff, held that a section 1404(a) transfer requested by a defendant should not result in a change of applicable
law. 3 ' Limiting its decision to defendant-initiated transfers, the Court
examined the legislative history of section 1404(a) and found no evidence that Congress intended transfers under section 1404(a) to produce changes in the applicable substantive law.3 2 Section 1404(a), the
Court concluded, "should be regarded as a federal judicial housekeeping measure, dealing with the placement of litigation in the federal courts and generally intended... simply to authorize a change of
33

courtrooms."

text of cases transferred under § 1404(a). In holding that the transferee court should
apply the choice of law of the state in which the transferor court sat, the Court noted that
"the critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district which decides the case
and the courts of the State in which the action was filed." Id at 639. As an example of the
anomalous results that might accompany blanket application of forum state choice of law,
the Van Dusen Court noted that a claim transferred "purely for reasons of convenience"
might be dismissed by a transferee court whose choice of law rules called for the application of a shorter statute of limitations. Id. at 630, n.25 (citing Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 1347,
1354-55 (1951)).
29
Ferens, 494 U.S. at 531.
30 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Van Dusen involved litigation arising out of a commercial
airline crash in Massachusetts. The defendants, seeking to consolidate litigation in Massachusetts, moved under § 1404(a) to have claims filed in Pennsylvania district court transferred to Massachusetts. Van Dusen, a plaintiff in one of the Pennsylvania actions,
opposed the transfer on the grounds that the applicable law in Massachusetts was less
favorable to her claim.
31 Id. at 639.
32
33

Id. at 635.

Id. at 636-37 (citation omitted).
In addition to the legislative history of the section, the Court offered two policy reasons for applying transferor law after a § 1404 transfer. First, the Court expressed concern
for the forum shopping implications of a rule that would allow changes in substantive law
to accompany transfer of venue. Id. at 636. Second, the Court concluded that the application of transferor law to a claim transferred under § 1404(a) was consistent with the choice
of law principles laid out in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The Court
reasoned that a change in substantive law would be available to a litigant in federal court
but not in state court, violating the principle that the "'accident' of federal diversity" not
produce different results in two courtrooms a block apart. Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 638
(citing Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945)).
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The Van Dusen Court limited its holding to cases involving defendant-initiated transfersA4 The question of whose law to apply after a
plaintiff-initiated transfer reached the Supreme Court in Ferens v. John
Deere Co.3 5 The FerensCourt, relying heavily on the reasoning that motivated the Van Dusen decision, extended the applicability of transferor law to plaintiff-initiated transfers.8 6 Recognizing that the
application of transferor law after a plaintiff-initiated transfer would
deprive the defendant of some tactical advantages, 3 7 the Court nonetheless held that transferor law should "apply regardless of who initiates the transfer. A transfer under section 1404(a), in other words,
38
does not change the law applicable to a diversity case."
The holding that transferor law should apply after a section
1404(a) transfer makes transfer under that section the equivalent of
dismissal for a time-barred claim. The transferee court, upon receiving the claim, would apply transferor law, including the transferor
statute of limitations. The claim would be dismissed from the trans34 I& at 640 ("We do not attempt to determine whether, for example, the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought transfer under 1404(a)....").
35 494 U.S. 516 (1990). The plaintiffs in Ferens filed suit in Mississippi, where the
defendant did business, for a tort alleged to have occurred in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs'
claim, time barred in Pennsylvania, was within Mississippi's unusually long statute of limitations. Id. at 520. The plaintiffs then moved for transfer under § 1404(a), assuming that
Mississippi choice of law rules would continue to govern after transfer to a more convenient forum. The Ferens' motion was granted, and the claim was transferred to the Western District of Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania court, however, refused to apply
Mississippi's longer statute of limitations and dismissed the claim on the basis of Pennsylvania's much shorter statute of limitations. Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1484
(W.D. Pa. 1986). The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that transferee choice of law should
govern after a plaintiff-initiated transfer. Ferens,494 U.S. at 521.
36
Ferens, 494 U.S. at 519. Noting that the reasoning behind the Van Dusen decision
applied with equal force to plaintiff initiated transfer, the Ferens Court wrote:
First, § 1404(a) should not deprive parties of state-law advantages that exist
absent diversityjurisdiction. Second, § 1404(a) should not create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping. Third, the decision to transfer
venue under § 1404(a) should turn on considerations of convenience and
the interest ofjustice rather than on the possible prejudice resulting from a
change of law.
Id. at 523.
37 Id. at 525 ("[D] efendant may lose a nonlegal advantage. Deere, for example, would
lose whatever advantage inheres in not having to litigate in Pennsylvania, or, put another
way, in forcing the Ferenses to litigate in Mississippi or not at all."). The Court concluded
that the disadvantage to the defendant of allowing transferor law to be applied in the
transferee court was preferable to the unfairness that would result from the application of
transferee law to transferred claims. The Court also noted that, as a practical matter, the
opposite rule would not necessarily be helpful to defendants. Even if transferee law were
applied after plaintiff initiated transfers, plaintiffs could either opt to pursue the claim in
the inconvenient forum or wait for the defendant to initiate transfer (in which case the
resulting choice of law would be governed by Van Dusen). Id. at 526-27 (citing Currivan,
supra note 7, at 156).

38

Id. at 523.
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feree court just as it would have been dismissed from the transferor
court.
The time-barred plaintiff, precluded from the use of section
1404(a) by the Ferens rule, must rely on section 1406(a). Section
1406 (a), unlike section 1404(a), allows the post-transfer application of
transferee law,3 9 thereby enabling the plaintiff to take advantage of a
longer limitations period in the transferee forum. Section 1406(a),
however, was historically reserved for instances in which the original
40
filing was defective as to venue, personal jurisdiction, or both.
Recognizing that only a section 1406(a) transfer could save a
time-barred claim, some courts have seized upon the expansive language contained in early interpretations of section 1406(a). These
courts have argued that a limitations bar, like defects in venue or personal jurisdiction, make the original district "wrong" for section 1406
purposes, bringing the claim within the curative sphere of the statute.
The balance of this Note argues that section 1406 should not be so
construed.
II
SECTION

1406(a)

AND LIMITATIONS-BARRED CLAIMS

Section 1406, which by its terms addresses only defects in venue,
has been interpreted broadly to cover defects in personal jurisdiction
as well. Courts have used this broad interpretation to suggest that the
statute should be read to cover other defects, including statute of limitations defenses.
Section A of this analysis examines both the legislative history of
the statute and early interpretations of section 1406 that extended its
effects to defects in personal jurisdiction. This section concludes that
the extension of section 1406 to defects in personal jurisdiction is best
understood as a product of the unique relationship between venue
and personal jurisdiction, and that the same reasoning cannot be used
to extend section 1406 to defects in limitations law. Section B concludes that the transfer of these claims is inconsistent with the choiceof-law framework developed for federal courts. Section C suggests
that section 1406 is best read to contain a timely filing requirement
that precludes the transfer of claims filed late in the transferor court.

39 See, e.g., Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980) ("[i]f an action is transferred under § 1406(a), the state law of the transferee district court should be applied.").
40 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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A. Applying Section 1406 to Defects Other than Venue
Section 1406(a) authorizes transfer of venue, and tolling of the
limitations period,4 ' for cases filed in the "wrong division or district."42 The crucial question in determining the scope of the statute
thus becomes what exactly makes a division or district "wrong." If, as
at least one court has argued, 43 a district can be considered "wrong"
because of a limitations bar, the statute can be used to authorize transfer of time-barred claims. 44
1.

The Legislative History of Section 1406

Commentators have argued that the legislative history of section
1406 indicates a congressional intent to limit the section's application
to claims filed in districts that do not meet venue requirements. 45
The legislative history of section 1406(a) supports this conclusion. A
committee report refers to section 1406(a) as providing "statutory
sanction for transfer instead of dismissal, where venue is improperly
laid."46 Professor Moore, testifying before a congressional subcommittee, similarly referred to the section as designed to address defects in
venue. 47 There is no indication that section 1406(a) was designed to
Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 430 n.7 (1964) (citing cases).
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).
43
See Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1988).
44 Id. Porterinvolved a medical malpractice action brought in the Eastern District of
Virginia. The claim, based upon an allegedly negligent operation performed in North
Carolina three years earlier, had previously been filed and voluntarily dismissed in the
Eastern District of North Carolina. Defendant, arguing that the claim was governed by
Virginia law, moved for dismissal under Virginia's two year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. Plaintiffs responded with a motion to transfer to North Carolina,
where a "savings statute" would have allowed the plaintiffs to refile within a year of their
voluntary dismissal. More than a year having passed between the voluntary dismissal and
the motion to dismiss in Virginia, the Porters were not in a position to simply refile the
claim in North Carolina. The tolling provision of§ 1406(a) was required to save the claim.
The district court, finding venue proper in Virginia, denied the motion to transfer and
ordered the case dismissed on the basis of the Virginia statute of limitations. Relying on an
expansive interpretation of what makes a district "improper" for the purposes of § 1406,
the Fourth Circuit found that § 1406(a) could be invoked to transfer a limitations-barred
claim from an otherwise proper venue. Id. at 258 ("[W]e read § 1406(a) to authorize the
transfer to the Eastern District of North Carolina when the statute of limitations would bar
adjudication on the merits in the Eastern District of Virginia but not in the Eastern District
of North Carolina.").
45
See, e.g., 15 WiGrr Er AL., supra note 17, at 263 ("A prerequisite to invoking
§ 1406(a) is that the venue must be improper.").
46 COMMrI-rmE ON RESION OF THE LAWS, U.S. CONGRESS, REVISION OF TrrLE 28, U.S.C.,
A128 (1946).
47 Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: HearingsBefore Subcommittee No. 1
of the HouseJudiciaryCommittee on H.R 1600 and HR. 2055, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1947)
(statement ofJames William Moore, Professor of Law, Yale University) ("Improper venue is
no longer grounds for dismissal of an action in the Federal courts. Instead the district
court is to transfer the case to the proper venue.").
41
42
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address defects other than venue. 48 Were it not for subsequent interpretations of the statute, the use of section 1406(a) to transfer claims
filed in a proper venue would be beyond the authority conferred by
the statute. Legislative history notwithstanding, the curative role of
section 1406(a) has been expanded beyond defects in venue to include defects in personal jurisdiction.
2.

Section 1406 and Defects in PersonalJurisdiction

In the years immediately following the Judiciary Act of 1948,
questions arose as to a federal court's authority to order section
1406(a) transfers of claims over which it lacked either personal or subject matter jurisdiction. Whereas a uniform rule emerged requiring a
court to have subject matter jurisdiction before it could order a transfer,49 the federal courts reached conflicting conclusions regarding a
court's authority to order the transfer of a claim over which it lacked
personal jurisdiction. 50
Illustrative of the debate among the circuits is Goldlawr v. Heiman,5 1 eventually used by the Supreme Court to resolve the issue. Goldlawr involved a private antitrust action brought against multiple
defendants in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. 52 The defendants, claiming improper venue and lack
of personal jurisdiction, moved for dismissal. 53 The district court,
agreeing with the defendants that venue was improper and that personal jurisdiction was lacking, nevertheless refused to dismiss.5 4 Instead, the court invoked section 1406(a) and ordered the case
transferred to the Southern District of New York. 55 The defendants
48

The Portercourt itself recognized that the plain language of the statute seemed to

limit its applicability to defects of venue. Porter v. Groat, 840 F.2d 255 at 257. The Court
noted:
The district court read the statute to permit a transfer only where the impediment to a decision on the merits by the court in which the case was
filed was an absence of venue.... If we were applying the statute as a
matter of first impression, we would agree that the district court correctly
interpreted it.
Id.
49
First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, 190 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1951), rev'd
on othergrounds, 342 U.S. 396 (1952).
50
See Timothy C. Frautschi, Comment, PersonalJurisdictionRequirements UnderFederal
Change of Venue Statutes, 1962 Wxsc. L. REv. 342, 342 n.5 (1962) (listing cases supporting
and rejecting transfer without personal jurisdiction); Comment, Transfer in the Federal
Courts in theAbsence of PersonalJurisdiction,61 COLUM. L. Rnv. 902,906-10 (1961) (summarizing the rationales advanced in early decisions for and against the transfer of cases over
which the court lacked personal jurisdiction).
51 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
52
Id. at 464.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55
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appeared in .the Southern District and moved for dismissal, claiming
that the Pennsylvania district court's lack of personal jurisdiction over
the defendants precluded its use of section 1406(a). 5 6 The New York
57
district court granted the motion and dismissed the claim.
On appeal, a divided Second Circuit held that transfers from
courts that lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant were beyond the authority granted by the statute:5 8
Section 1406(a) provides for the transfer of cases when venue is improper. It does not mention jurisdictional defects. Whatever be the
desirability of a rule that a district court may transfer a case when
venue is mislaid and jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
lacking, it is an unwarranted exercise of judicial interpretation to
find that a statute, expressly providing for transfer to cure a venue
defect, impliedly provides for a transfer to cure a more basic jurisdictional defect. The lesser does not by implication include the
59
greater.
The Supreme Court reversed. 60 In holding that section 1406(a)
transfers did not require that the transferor court obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant, the Court explicitly endorsed a broad
reading of the section: "The language of 1406(a) is amply broad
enough to authorize the transfer of cases, however wrong the plaintiff
may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in
which it was filed had personal jurisdiction over the defendants or
not."61 In so doing, the Court referred to a general congressional policy of "removing whatever obstacles may impede an expeditious and
62
orderly adjudication of cases and controversies."
The Supreme Court also noted the significance of a plaintiff's
timely filing, regardless of the propriety of the forum in which the
claim was filed. 63 The Court argued that Congress, in passing section

1406(a), recognized that the "interest ofjustice" required that certain
claims be transferred to escape "time consuming and justice defeating
56
57
58

Id

62
63

I&

I. at 465.

Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
See Comment, Transferin the FederalCourtsin the Absence ofPersonalJuisdiction,supranote 50,
at 912 (discussing Goldlawr decision).
59 288 F.2d at 582.
60
Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
61 Id. at 466.
Id. at 467. The Court observed:
When a lawsuit is filed, that filing shows a desire on the part of the plaintiff
to begin his case and thereby toll whatever statutes of limitation would
otherwise apply. The filing itself shows the proper diligence on the part of
the plaintiff which such statutes of limitations were intended to insure.
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technicalities," 64 and that interpreting section 1406(a) to require dismissal where the plaintiff has made a mistake would "at least partially
frustrate this enlightened congressional objective." 65 As courts continued to struggle to find the exact parameters of their authority to authorize section 1406(a) transfers, the broad language of the Goldlawr
66
decision proved very powerful in extending the statute's reach.
Goldlawr held that section 1406 could be used to transfer claims
defective as to both personal jurisdiction and venue. It did not address
the applicability of section 1406 to claims defective only as to personal
jurisdiction. Courts confronted with claims that met venue requirements but fell outside their territorial jurisdiction thus faced a dilemma. They could have remained faithful to the language of section
1406 and refused to transfer a claim filed in a proper venue. This,
however, would have placed the plaintiff who had erred as to both
personal jurisdiction and venue in a better position than the plaintiff
who had erred only as to personal jurisdiction. 67 Unwilling to sanction this obvious injustice, courts universally rejected this approach. 68
Instead, courts resorted to various interpretations of both transfer
provisions to reach the result desired. 69 Many courts relied on what
64 Id. at 467 (quoting Internatio-Rotterdam, Inc. v. Thomson, 218 F.2d 514, 517 (4th
Cir. 1955)).
65 Id.
66
Several courts have argued that Congress has intervened to obviate the need for an
expansive reading of § 1406(a). Ross v. Colorado Outward Bound Sch., Inc., 822 F.2d
1524, 1526-27 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1988)); Murphy v. Klein Tools,
Inc., 693 F. Supp. 982, 986 (D. Kan. 1988) (same). Both Ross and Murphy cite 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631 as an expression of Congress' desire to clear up confusion surrounding transfer of
cases over which a federal court lacks jurisdiction.
While courts have applied § 1631 to cases over which the court lacked personal jurisdiction, the legislative history of the statute indicates that Congress' objective in passing
§ 1631 was primarily to cure defects in subject matter jurisdiction associated with the creation of the new federal circuit. See 15 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 17, at 262 n. 5 ("The
suggestion by one author that the 1982 [federal transfer] statute may have something to do
with venue or personal jurisdiction.., flies in the face of the language and the legislative
history of the statute.");JeffreyW. Tayon, The Federal TransferStatute: 28 U.S.C. § 1631,29 S.
TEx. LJ. 189, 224 (1987) (noting that the legislative history of the section makes no reference to lack of personal jurisdiction).
67 Justices Harlan and Stewart, dismissing the possibility that § 1406 could apply to
properly venued claims, dissented from the Goldlawrmajority's broad reading of§ 1406 for
precisely this reason. Goldlavr, 369 U.S. at 468 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan noted:
it is incongruous to consider, as the Court's holding would seem to imply,
that in the 'interest ofjustice' Congress sought § 1406(a) to deal with the
transfer of cases where both venue and jurisdiction are lacking in the district where the action is commenced, while neglecting to provide any comparative alleviative measure for the plaintiff who selects a district where
venue is proper but where personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained.
Id.
68
See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 1980).
69
See id at 473-74 (discussing the several bases for transfer of claims filed in a correct
venue but over which the court lacks personal jurisdiction).
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has been referred to as a "broad reading" of section 1406,70 one which
allows the transfer of claims filed in a proper venue if personal jurisdiction is lacking. Although perhaps inconsistent with a statute
phrased in terms of defects in venue, this result eliminates prejudice
toward plaintiffs who, in choosing a proper venue, are mistaken only
as to personal jurisdiction. This position was first expressed by the
71
Fifth Circuit in Dubin v. United States.
Dubin presented the dilemma hypothesized by the Goldlawr dissent a claim that met venue requirements but fell outside the personal jurisdiction of the district court.7 2 The Fifth Circuit, citing
Courts have resorted to some creative statutory interpretation in their efforts to resolve the apparent inconsistency created by the statute's venue-specific language. In Corke
v. Sameiet Song of Norway, 572 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit authorized
transfer by collapsing §§ 1404 and 1406.
The Fifth Circuit, agreeing with the conclusion that claims over which a court lacks
personal jurisdiction could be transferred despite proper venue, adopted a slightly different reasoning: "In this circuit, we achieve the same result by invoking either section, not
by reading the two together." Liaw Su Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140,
1148 (5th Cir. 1984). The court concluded that "a transfer to a district in which personal
jurisdiction over the defendant can be obtained may properly be made under either section 1404(a) or section 1406(a)." Id. at 1148 (quoting Ellis v. Great S.W. Corp., 646 F.2d
1099, 1106 (1981)).
Commentators and courts have criticized the failure to properly distinguish
§§ 1404(a) and 1406(a). See, e.g., 15 WRIGT ET Al., supra note 17, at 262-64. Wright,
Miller and Cooper, agreeing that a claim lacking personal jurisdiction should be transferable from a district in which venue is proper, argue that this result should be obtained
through § 1404(a), not § 1406(a). Id. This solution would preserve the reading of§ 1406
as a statute directed only at venue and eliminate the need for a broad reading of § 1406:
A number of cases have held that § 1406(a) applies, even though venue is
proper in the district, if personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the
defendant in that district. The result is entirely sound. If, as Goldlawr
holds, transfer can be ordered of a case from a district where both venue
and personal jurisdiction are lacking, it should follow a fortiori that there
can be transfer if venue is proper and only personal jurisdiction is lacking.
But the correct way to achieve this result is to apply the Goldlawr principle
by analogy to transfers under 28 U.S.CA. § 1404(a), the statute that allows
transfer from one proper venue to another. The end result is the same,
and very few litigants will care whether the court purports to proceed under
1404(a) or 1406(a) in transferring to a district where service can be made.
Thus it is hardly surprising that many courts say that either statute can be

used. But such statements as "venue is 'wrong' in this district in the sense
that litigation may not proceed because of absence of personal jurisdiction
over the defendant" blur the very different concepts of venue and personal
jurisdiction.
Id. at 264-66 (footnotes omitted).
70 See Manley v. Engram, 755 F.2d 1463, 1467 n.8 (lth Cir. 1985); Sinclair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Taylor v. Love, 415 F.2d 1118, 1120 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970); Mayo Clinic v. Kaiser, 383 F.2d 653 (8th Cir.
1967); Dubin v. United States, 380 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1967); 15 WRIGHT ET AL.., supra note

17, § 3827, at 264 n.11 (listing cases in accord with Dubin).
71

380 F.2d 813.

72

Id.
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Goldlawrextensively, 73 adopted a broad view of what made venue improper for the purpose of the statute. Noting that the language of the
statute did not speak to" 'wrong' venue but rather to venue laid in a
'wrong division or district,' "74 the court held that the transferor
court's lack of personal jurisdiction made the district improper for the
purposes of section 1406 transfer.
The Dubin court's reading of section 1406 (a), generally accepted
by other circuits, 75 paved the way for subsequent attempts to apply
section 1406 to limitations-barred claims. By allowing section 1406(a)
to apply to claims filed in a proper venue, the Dubin court divorced
section 1406(a) of any improper venue requirement and recast the
section as a general device aimed at the removal of vaguely defined
"obstacles" to adjudication. 76
3. DistinguishingStatutes of Limitations and Place-of-Suit
The extension of section 1406 to defects in personal jurisdiction
is best understood as a product of the unique relationship between
personal jurisdiction and venue. 77 If, as some commentators suggest,
the concepts of venue and personal jurisdiction in federal court are
properly conceived of as two sides of a single coin, there is no reason
to treat the two concepts separately in deciding how to allocate claims
among federal courts. A provision designed to protect plaintiffs from
complicated venue statutes would serve the same interests when ap78
plied to defects in personal jurisdiction.
73
half of
74
75
76

Id., passim. Almost half of Dubin consists of a quotation from Goldlawr. More than
Goldlawr is reprinted in Dubin.
Id. at 815.
See supra note 70 (cases in accord with Dubin).
Dubin, 380 F.2d at 815 ("We conclude that a district is 'wrong' within the meaning

of § 1406 whenever there exists an 'obstacle [to] * * * an expeditious and orderly adjudication' on the merits. Inability to perfect service of process on a defendant in an otherwise
correct venue is such an obstacle.").
The Dubin court did not suggest a list of "obstacles" that might justify transfer under
§ 1406. In fact, the opinion contains contradictory language with respect to obstacles that
might qualify as grounds for transfer. In discussing the differences between §§ 14 04 (a)
and 1406(a), the Dubin court notes that § 1406(a) applies "when there exists an obstacleeither incorrect venue, absence of personal jurisdiction, or both .... " 380 F.2d at 816.
This language suggests that the "obstacles" justifying transfer are limited to defects in
venue, personal jurisdiction, or both. Later in the same paragraph, however, the court
notes that § 1406(a) applies "in cases where the first forum chosen is improper in the sense
that litigation may not proceed there," a much broader categorization. Id.
77 See Clermont, supra note 1, at 430-37 (describing the concepts of personal jurisdiction and venue as sharing "common history," "similar purposes," and "parallel structure").
78 Objections to the extension of the statute stemmed mainly from the idea that a
venue statute should not be read to cure defects in personal jurisdiction because "the
lesser does not by implication include the greater." Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 288 F.2d
579, 582 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 463 (1962). If, however, one accepts the argument
that federal court limitations on territorial jurisdiction are, like venue, primarily non-con-
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The GoldlawrCourt relied heavily on the common characteristics
of venue and personal jurisdiction in interpreting the scope of section
1406:
Indeed, this case is itself a typical example of the problem sought to
be avoided, for dismissal here would have resulted in plaintiffs losing a substantial part of its cause of action under the statute of limitations merely because it made a mistake in thinking that the
respondent corporations could be 'found' or that they 'transact
* * * business' in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The language
and history of § 1406(a) ...show a congressional purpose to provide as effective a remedy as possible to avoid precisely this sort of
79
injustice.
By alluding to the language of the venue statute applicable to the
case,8 0 the Goldlawr Court recognized the similar conceptual framework that underlies venue and personal jurisdiction.8 1 Perhaps more
importantly, the Court noted that transfer serves the same "congressional objective" whether the defect is in personal jurisdiction or
82
venue.
Within the federal system, both venue and personal jurisdiction
relate almost exclusively to place-of-suit. The limits on a district
court's territorial authority to adjudicate are not defined directly by
the Constitution. 3 Within the broad constraints of the constitutional
"forum reasonableness" provisions, Congress could extend the personal jurisdiction of federal courts to encompass virtually any diversity
action.8 4 Instead, through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Constitutional place-of-suit provisions, it makes little sense to define personal jurisdiction as
"greater than" venue.
79 Goldlan, 369 U.S. at 466 (footnotes omitted).
80 Id. at 464 n.7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1988)).
81
Id. at 466 n.11 (referring to "the difficulties which may arise in determining where
corporations can be found or transact business").
82
83

Id. at 467.

Constitutional limits on territorial authority to adjudicate in federal court are defined by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and are determined by the defendant's minimum contacts with the United States as a
whole, and by an element of "forum-reasonableness." See Clermont, supra note 1, at 427 &
n.82.
84 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., Venue and Service ofProcess in the Federal Courts-Suggestionsfor
Reform, 7 VA. L. Rav. 608, 629-30 (1954) ("In the federal courts... there is no constitutional impediment to Congress treating the entire country as a single jurisdiction and permitting service of process anywhere within it.") (citation omitted). See also Clermont, supra
note 1, at 427 n.82 (discussing Congress' power to confer nationwide jurisdiction on federal courts).
Professor Barrett may overstate Congress' power to confer territorial jurisdiction on
the federal courts. The Supreme Court has read the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to include an element of "forum reasonableness," which would circumscribe
Congress' authority to authorize nationwide service of process. See Clermont, supra note 1,
at 427 n.82 (reading the Fifth Amendment to impose venue restrictions on federal courts'
exercise ofjurisdiction).
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gress has limited the reach of a district court's personal jurisdiction
with place-of-suit provisions determined by an interaction of federal
statute and state law.8 5 In this respect, limitations on territorial authority to adjudicate in diversity actions are similar to venue restrictions, which are simply statutory rules without constitutional
dimension. Given the similar nature of these place-of-suit provisions,
it is reasonable to attribute to Congress a desire to treat the two
consistently.
Statutes of limitations are qualitatively different, in that they are
in no sense related to place-of-suit.8 6 Whereas the "correction" of
place-of-suit errors provided for by section 1406 involves the modification of federal place-of-suit provisions embodied in venue and personal jurisdiction restraints, the modification of statutes of limitations
87
deals with interests created by and defined by the states.
Combined with a court's authority to transfer claims over which it
has no personal jurisdiction, the authority to transfer limitations85

The jurisdictional reach of federal courts sitting in diversity is defined by a combi-

nation of federal statutes, federal rules of civil procedure and state law made applicable to
the federal courts through the operation of the Erie doctrine. These boundaries to district
court jurisdiction are best seen as self-imposed, non-constitutional limitations. See Clermont, supranote 1, at 427 n.84.
86 Statutes of limitations protect two interests, those of the defendant and those of the
forum. The defendant has an interest in having a definite period of time after which she is
free of the risk of liability. See Burnett v. New York Cent. RR., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)

("Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure fairness to defendants. Such statutes 'promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been
allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have

disappeared.'" (quoting Order of R.R Tels. v. Railway Express Agency, Inc. 321 U.S. 342,
348-49 (1944)); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. Rxv. 277, 325-26
(1990). The forum has an interest in not deciding cases on the basis of "stale evidence"
and in "allocating judicial resources to more recent cases." Kramer, supra, at 326 (citing
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)).
87 See Kramer, supra note 86, at 325-26.
In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), the Supreme Court, per Justice
Scalia, refused to recharacterize statute of limitations as substantive rather than procedural. 486 U.S. at 726. In so doing, the Court relied on the historical notion that statutes
of limitations are best seen as protecting the interests of the state, not the defendant. "The
period sufficient to constitute a bar to the litigation of sta[l]e demands, is a question of
municipal policy and regulation, and one which belongs to the discretion of every government, consulting its own interests and convenience." Id. at 726 (quoting 2 JAMEs K NT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMEmCAN LAw 462-63 (2d ed. 1832) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Justice Brennan undertook a more complex treatment of the interests contained in a
statute of limitations in a concurring opinion. 486 U.S. 736 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan also characterized statutes of limitations as a reflection of a series of state
interests:
The statute of limitations a State enacts represents a balance between, on
the one hand, its substantive interest in vindicating substantive claims and,
on the other hand, a combination of its procedural interest in freeing its
courts from adjudicating stale claims and its substantive interest in giving
individuals repose from ancient breaches of law.
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barred claims would effectively create a national filing system for federal courts. Filing in any federal court, regardless of whether the district is proper as to venue, personal jurisdiction, or limitations law,
would serve to toll any applicable statute of limitations. Having tolled
the applicable limitations period, the plaintiff could then search for a
proper district in which to pursue his claim.
Congress could provide for a national filing system were it so inclined. This might be accomplished in two ways. Congress could enact a national tolling provision for actions filed in federal court.
Statutes of limitations in federal courts have repeatedly been characterized as procedural,8 8 and thus subject to the control of Congress
acting pursuant to Article 111.89 Alternatively, Congress could provide
for federal choice-of-law rules that would allow for the application of
the longer transferee court statute of limitations. 90 In either case the
first filing of the action would remain operative for statutes of limitations purposes, regardless of the propriety of the district in which the
claim was filed.
Congress' broad authority notwithstanding, there is no indication
that Congress intended to exercise its power to create a national filing
system when it promulgated the transfer statutes. 9 1 There is, rather,
reason to believe that Congress intended the transfer statutes to function within the choice-of-law framework established for federal courts
92
in Klaxon v. Stentor.
B.

Choice-of-Law

In Klaxon v. Stentor the Supreme Court extended the Erie doctrine
to state choice-of-law rules. 93 Federal district courts were instructed to
apply the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sat. Although
subjected to periodic attack,9 4 Klaxon has been left undisturbed for
half a century.
88

Se , e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (characterizing statutes

of limitations as procedural for choice of law purposes).
89
U.S. CONST. art. III. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988) (Congress exercising its authority to regulate procedure in federal courts).
90 See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. P'v. 383, 401-02 (1964).
91 See supra Part II.A.1. (discussing legislative history of transfer statutes).
92 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
93 Id. at 496.
94 See; e.g., PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART AND WECHsLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 794-800 (3d ed. 1988) (questioning and criticizing Kaxon); Daniel

C.K. Chow, Limiting Erie in a New Age of InternationalLaw, 74 IoWA L. REv. 165, 179 n.69
(1988) (summarizing criticism of Klaxon); Paul S. Bird, Note, Mass Tort Litigation:A Statutoiy Solution to the Choice of Law Impasse, 96 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 n.8 (1987) (listing commentators critical of Kaxon).
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Klaxon instructs federal courts to apply state choice-of-law rules to
claims filed in a proper federal forum. The choice-of-law rules for
section 1404 transfer developed in Ferens v. John Deere Co. preserve this
framework by providing for post-transfer application of these same
rules.9 5 Transfers under section 1406 are similarly in tune with the
Klaxon choice-of-law scheme. The choice-of-law scheme of a particular state does not attach to a claim filed in an improper federal forum.
Accordingly, these choice-of-law rules do not follow the transferred
claim.
Attempts to extend section 1406 to defects in limitations law undermine this choice-of-law framework. By providing for the application of transferee choice-of-law rules following a filing in a proper
forum, these decisions destroy the symmetry that characterizes the interplay between the transfer statutes and the Klaxon choice-of-law
regime. 96
The application of transferee law following transfer from a
proper venue allows courts to bypass Klaxon by escaping forum state
choice-of-law rules. This bypass undermines the very purposes of the
Klaxon rule. Klaxon was based primarily on the desire to align federal
and state court proceedings within a single state, so that "the accident
of diversity" would not lead to different outcomes in adjacent courthouses. 9 7 The application of section 1406 to time-barred claims leads
to the opposite result, in that the claim properly filed in federal court
will eventually be governed by the choice-of-law rules of the transferee
court.
Absent congressional indication to the contrary, federal courts
should observe the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit.
Transfers designed to evade statutes of limitations defenses are instances of federal choice-of-law not contemplated by the current diversity framework. Although Congress would be free, within broad limits,
to provide for federal choice-of-law rules, there is no indication that
Congress intended the federal transfer statutes to authorize a departure from the Klaxon regime.
C.

The Timely FilingRequirement

The analysis thus far suggests that section 1406 is best read to
contain a timely filing requirement that prohibits transfer of claims
that are not filed within the statute of limitations of the transferor
court. As applied to claims filed in a proper venue with jurisdiction
over the action, the timely filing requirement ensures that transfer will
95

See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text.

See generally Currivan, supra note 7, passim (interplay of transfer of venue and choice
of law rules); Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469 (6th Cir. 1980) (same).
97 Klaxon, 313 U.S at 496.
96
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not upset the Klaxon choice-of-law regime. 98 This timely filing requirement ought to extend to all section 1406 transfers, whether or

not the transferor court sits in a district that is "wrong" for the purposes of the section.9 9 This would ensure that the plaintiff who files

late in an improper forum is not given a remedy withheld from a
plaintiff who files late in a proper court.10 0 The diligence of the plaintiff should be measured only by the statute of limitations of the court
in which the plaintiff chose to file his claim.1 0

Where transfer occurs from a forum that lacks either proper
venue or jurisdiction over the action, the subordination of the transferee statute of limitations may at first seem odd. In these cases, the

transferee court sits in the only forum that retains an interest in the
action. The transferor court, lacking proper venue or personal jurisdiction, has no interest in the adjudication of the claim. The trans-

feree court, on the other hand, will have proper venue and personal
jurisdiction with respect to the claim, and thus, presumably, an inter-

est in its adjudication. 10 2 One might argue that the transferee forum
should be free to retain choice-of-law rules that toll their own statute

of limitations with respect to claims mistakenly filed in other forums
and that the federal transfer statute should not be used to cut short
the transferee statute of limitations.
The tolling effect of the federal transfer statutes, however, is itself
a matter of federal law,' 03 in that the tolling authorized by the statute

operates independently of the tolling provisions of the transferee
98 See supra part II.B.
99 Ferguson v. Kwik-Chek, 308 F. Supp. 78 (D.V.I. 1970), cited by Currivan, supra note
7, at 162 & n.65, as "the only reported case of this type," held otherwise.
100
The opposite conclusion would encourage defendants to consent to jurisdiction
and venue in the transferor court by failing to raise them as defenses. SeeFED. R. Civ. P. 12
(h) (1). Consent to venue and jurisdiction would make the transferor district proper for
the purpose of the transfer statutes, precluding application of transferee law once transfer
is had and forcing the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims.
101
See Currivan, supra note 7, at 163 ("[O]nly a timely filing in the first forum should
toll the statute of limitations of the second.").
102
See infra note 22 and accompanying text (requirement that transferee court have
proper venue and personal jurisdiction with respect to the transferred claim).
103
PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEms 1140 & n.10 (2d ed. 1973).
In removed cases, federal law will in turn call for application of the state statute of
limitations and the state law of commencement. This will ordinarily be the case whether or
not the cause of action is based on state law, and whether or not the applicable statute of
limitations arises from state law. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 120 (1945) (whether
case is pending in state court for the purpose of tolling a federal statute of limitations is
determined by state law); 'Winkels v. George A. Hormel & Co., 874 F.2d 567, 570 (8th Cir.
1989) ("[A] federal court must honor state court rules governing commencement of civil
actions when an action is first brought in state court and then removed to federal court.");
McConnell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1484, 1498 (E.D. Tex. 1992)
(same); Dravo Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 602 F. Supp. 1136, 1189 (W.D. Pa. 1985)
(same).
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state. Federal interests embodied in the statutory sections likewise legitimize the subordination of transferee statute of limitations in favor
of a federal timely filing requirement. This federal timely filing requirement should require that all transferred claims be filed within
the statute of limitations of the transferor court
CONCLUSION

Transfer of venue in the federal court system is inexorably tied to
choice-of-law. Fairness to the litigants, respect for state interests, and
doctrinal consistency require that transfer of venue and choice-of-law
rules be aligned to accommodate both the place-of-suit provisions of
the federal courts and the substantive concerns embodied in state law.
The extension of section 1406 to time-barred claims undermines this
matrix by allowing federal courts to circumvent state choice-of-law
rules. Section 1406 is best read to contain a blanket rule that makes
the availability of transfer dependent upon commencement of the action within the applicable limitations period in the transferor court.
Roberto Finzit
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